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Abstract 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too 
quickly ·when they prod the Financial Accouming Standards Board, the 
standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based 
system. Priorities respecting reform ofcOJporate reporting in the US need to be 
ordered more care.fitlly. Incentive problems impairing audit performance 
should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the auditfrom the 
negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems 
otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and 
management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect. the 
US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned to take responsi-
bilityfor the delicate law-to~fact applications that are the hallmarks ofprinci-
ples-based systems. Principles, taken alone, do little to constrain rent-seeking 
Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center. 
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behaviour. In a world of captured regulators, they invite applications that suit 
the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their flaws, better constrain 
managers and compromised auditors. Broadbrush reformulations of rules-
based GAAP should follow only when institutional reforms have succeeded. 
Keywords: corporation and securities law, illegal behaviour and the enforce-
ment of law, accounting and auditing general. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
American equityholders awoke in 2002 to realize they no longer could trust 
corporate financial reports.' Their doubts extended beyond Enron and the Arthur 
Andersen firm" to a large set of companies with reputations for aggressive 
accounting. Entire sectors were implicated, finance and telecommunications 
most prominently. Securities issuers, oriented toward shareholder value enhance-
ment by the corporate culture of the 1990s, had been adopting aggressive, even 
fraudulent treatments to enhance reported earnings, and their auditors had been 
doing nothing to stop them. The auditors had sold their independence in 
exchange for consulting rents. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
some years before, had issued loud warnings about this dirty deal and its implica-
tions for reporting quality.' But nobody in the investment community paid 
attention so long as money kept falling from the sky during the 1990s bull market. 
Things were different in 2002. As equityholders struggled in the worst bear 
market in a generation, diminished auditor independence triggered a crisis of 
' See, e.g., G. Morgenson, 'Worries of More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding', 
N.Y. Times (30 January 2002) p. C 1. 
2 For a review ofEnron disaster, see W.W. Bratton, 'Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value', 76 Tulane L. Rev. (2002) p. 1275. 
' See, e.g., A. Levitt, 'Renewing the Covenant With Investors', Speech given at the New 
York University Center for Law and Business ( 10 May 2000) (available at <www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch> (last visited 25 January 2004)). 
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confidence in corporate reporting. As audit failures~ piled up, investors lost 
confidence in managers, market intermediaries, and auditors alike. Share prices 
suffered as a result. 
The auditars responded by pointing a finger at US accounting's standard-
setter, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the standards it 
articulates, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The problem, 
said the auditors, was a shortage of rules. Auditors and reporting companies 
needed more guidance and regulators like FASB had failed to supply it. Joe 
Berardino, the managing partner of the Andersen firm, then under the gun for the 
audit failure at Enron and subsequent document shredding, led this counter-
attack. His firm's auditors, he said, had merely applied the rules. It followed that 
if there was a problem, it lay in the rules themselves, which permitted the oti 
balance sheet financing anangements that figured prominently in Emon's 
collapse. If something had gone wrong with the fairness of Enron's financial 
statements, then the rules ought to be rethought." The burden to effect improve-
ment lay on the F ASB and the SEC rather than on the audit firn1s: to restore confi-
dence, the SEC should supply 'immediate guidance' to public companies 
respecting disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions along with other 
transactional categories where Enron' s financials had proved wanting, such as 
over the counter derivative contracts and related-party transactions. In particular, 
the SEC should require issuers to provide more details respecting off balance 
sheet guarantees, commitments, and lease and debt arrangements that variously 
impact on credit ratings, earnings, cash tlow, or stock price." 
1 The decline in compliance has not been limited to companies subject to enforcement 
actions. such asCendant: see In re Cendant Co17J. Sec. Litig .. 109 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000). 
Investigations and criticisms touch reputable names such as Xerox: see C. Deutsch and R. 
Abelson. 'Xerox Facing New Pressures Over Auditing'. N.Y. Times (9 February 200 I) p. C I; 
Lucent: S. Romero. 'Lucent's Books Said to Draw Attention of the SEC'. N.Y. Times (I 0 
February 200 I) p. C I; American International, Coca Cola. and IBM: seeS. Liesman. 'Heard on 
the Street: Deciphering the Black Box'. Wall St. J. (23 January 2002); and General Electric itself. 
See J. Kahn. 'Accounting in Wonderland: Jeremy Kahn Goes Down the Rabbit Hole with G. E.'s 
Books'. Fortune ( 19 March 200 I) p. 37; R.E. Silverman and K. Brown. 'Five Companies: How 
They Get Their Numbers'. Wall St. J. (23 January 2002) pp. CI. Cl6. 
The General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman. Committee on Banking. Housing. and 
Urban Affairs. U.S. Senate. Finwzcial Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulaton· 
Responses, and Remaining Challenges (October 2002) (GA0-03-138) [hereafter cited as GAO 
Report]. surveys public company restatements 1997 to 2002. showing marked increases across 
the period. 
' J. Berardino. 'Enron: A Wake-Up Call'. Wall St. J. (4 December 2001) p. A IS. 
" J. Burns and M. Schroeder. 'Accounting Firms Ask SEC for Post-Enron Guide'. Wall St. J. 
(7 January 2002) p. A 16. 
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The auditors repeated an oft-heard refrain when they demanded more 
guidance from the standard setters, and so failed to deflect the blame from 
themselves. Worse, voices from outside the accounting profession responded to 
the auditors' defense by singing the opposite tune: Maybe the auditors had too 
much guidance; maybe the problem was not a shortage of rules on matters like 
off-balance sheet financing, derivative contracts, and leases, but an excess of 
rules. The critics charged that GAAP's exhaustive system of rules-based treat-
ments had fostered a dysfunctional, check-the-box approach to compliance. 
Pre parers and auditors applied the rules mechanically, ignoring the substance of 
the transactions being reported. 7 The rules-based system of regulation, they 
alleged, fostered a culture of noncompliance in which regulated actors invested 
in schemes of rule evasion. Harvey Pitt, then the SEC chairman, led the charge 
against FASB and its rules: 
'Present-day accounting standards are cumbersome and offer far too detailed pre-
scriptive requirements for companies and their accountants to follow. We seek to 
move toward a principles-based set of accounting standards, where mere compli-
ance with technical prescriptions is neither sufficient nor the objective. •K 
Capital Hill staffers, press commentators, and academics seconded Pitt in 
blaming the crisis on the rules and calling for principles-based accounting. 
Even Wall Street joined the call for principles, in a rare moment of concur-
rence with the policy community. Of course, Wall Street's motivation lay in the 
association of principles-based accounting with the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and selected for adoption by the European Commission.9 The 
case for principles-based accounting overlaps the case for regulatory interven-
tion to speed international securities market convergence, in particular SEC 
acceptance of financial reporting pursuant to IFRS. Principles-based 
accounting thus appeals to every intermediary on Wall Street anticipating more 
rents from foreign listing business. 
7 S. Liesman, 'SEC Accounting Cop's Warning: Playing By Rules May Not Ward Off Fraud 
Issues', Wall St. J. (12 February 2002) p. Cl; 'Leaders: The Lessons from Enron', Economist (9 
February 2002) pp. 9-10. 
' H.L. Pitt, Testimony Concerning The Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsi-
bility, and Transparence Act, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives p. 5. 
Available on the SEC website at <http: www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032002tshlp.htm> (last 
visited 26 January 2004). 
" Effective in 2005, listed companies in the EC will be required to report under IFRS. 
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The way thus prepared, the US Congress made its own call for principles 
when it enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), 10 the legislation that 
addresses the reporting crisis and attempts to restore confidence in the securities 
markets. SOA institutes a new regime of regulation of the accounting profes-
sion, following the standard regulatory strategy of delegating the task of filling 
in the new regime's terms to a new administrative agency, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). 11 On principles-based accounting, in 
contrast, SOA relies on the old agency, the SEC, ordering it to produce a study 
of the US accounting system that ascertains the extent to which it is principles-
based (as opposed to rules-based) and reports on the length of time needed to 
achieve transition to a basis in principles. 12 The SEC Report, which has 
appeared in due course, 13 confirms the relative superiority of principles-based 
over rules-based accounting and hands to FASB the job of a ground up 
reconstruction of US GAAP. 
111 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of II, 15, 18,28,and29U.S.C.). 
11 Sarbanes-Oxley Acts. 103 (c). 
" Sarbanes-Oxley Acts. 108 (d) provides as follows: 
SEC. I 08. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS. 
(d) STUDY AND REPORT ON ADOPTING PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING-
( I) STUDY 
(A) IN GENERAL The Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the United States 
financial reporting system of a principles-based accounting system. 
(B) STUDY TOPICS- The study required by subparagraph (A) shall include an examination of-
(i) the extent to which principles-based accounting and financial reporting exists in the United 
States; 
(ii) the length of time required for change from a rules-based to a principles-based financial 
reporting system; 
(iii) the feasibility of and proposed methods by which a principles- based system may be imple-
mented; and 
(iv) a thorough economic analysis of the implementation of a principles-based system. 
(2) REPORT- Not later than I year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall 
submit a report on the results of the study required by paragraph (I) to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House 
of Representatives. 
S. 108(d) is coupled with s. 108(a). which requires FASB and any other approved standards-
setting body to adopt procedures assuring prompt consideration of new rules reflecting 'interna-
tional convergence on high quality accounting standards.' 
1
' Office of the Chief Accountant, Office of Economic Analysis. SEC. Study Pursuant to 
Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption by the United States Financial 
Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accouting System (July 2003 ), available at <http:!/ 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlebasedstand.htm> [hereafter cited as SEC Report] (last 
visited 26 January 2004 ). 
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This Article enters a dissenting opinion. The dissent does not follow from a 
theoretical preference for rules over principles, however. In theory there need be 
nothing objectionable in an initiative that privileges principles over rules in the 
articulation of accounting standards (or, for that matter, any other regulation). 
Principles, or in lawyer's parlance 'standards', lead to more responsive and 
flexible regulation. The lawmaker announces a broad-brush directive in the 
expectation that more particular instructions will derive from law to fact applica-
tions over time. Because the principle guides each application to fact, principles-
based standards allow regulators to stay in closer touch with ultimate regulatory 
objectives even as they allow for variations in the facts of the cases. In contrast, 
rules-based systems tend toward formalism, even as they also tend to include 
statements of overarching principles. Whatever their motivating principles, 
exhaustively articulated rules that treat, categorize and distinguish complex trans-
actions invite mechanical application. In practice, the statement of the rule can 
come to dominate both the wider regulatory purpose and the particulars of the 
given case. Problems result, since no system of rules ever can anticipate all future 
cases. Clever planners exploit the pattern of mechanical application, devising 
transactions that fit the pattern but evade the regulation's spirit. US GAAP is 
justifiably famous for reliance on such rule-based treatments. 
In the abstract, then, well-drafted principles may offer a better mode for 
articulating accounting standards. Unfortunately, the US reporting system's 
infirmities cannot be cured in the abstract. GAAP' s rule-based treatments and 
the proposed move to principles must be evaluated in the process context in 
which preparers and auditors apply accounting principles. The process picture 
is not pretty. Professional standards have fallen to such a low estate that a near 
term shift to a principles-based system would create a significant risk of unin-
tended adverse consequences. 
Management decides on accounting treatments and prepares financial 
reports. Auditors merely review these decisions. 14 It follows in theory that 
auditors should be the most independent and adversary of professionals, ready 
at all times to reject management's treatments as unfair or noncompliant. 
Unfortunately, in US practice, corporate clients have captured the loyalty of 
their auditors to a degree comparable to their capture of the loyalty of their 
lawyers. Multiple factors contribute to this compromise of the professional 
relationship. Prime among them are nonaudit consulting rents, employment 
'" The leading discussion of the resulting incentive problem in the legal literature is M.A. 
Eisenberg, 'Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, 
Directors and Accountants', 63 Cal. L. Rev. (1975) p. 375. Eisenberg's critique continues to 
resonate in 2004. 
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opportunities at clients, and audit industry concentration. 1' Now, had the 
Congress enacting SOA been serious about realigning auditor incentives and 
ameliorating their capture by the client interest, the statute would have prohib-
ited all nonaudit forms of business consulting by audit firms. SOA, more 
cautiously, opts for gradual improvement through periodic professional review. 
It facilitates audit reform without assuring it, leaving it to the PCAOB and the 
SEC to address (or finesse) the problem of industry capture. 
So long as management incentives respecting accounting treatments and 
auditor independence remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor 
plausibly positioned to take responsibility for the delicate law to fact applications 
that are the hallmarks of principles-based systems. Principles, taken alone, do 
little to constrain rent-seeking behaviour. In a world of captured regulators, they 
invite applications that suit the regulated actor's interests. Rules, with all their 
flaws, better constrain managers and their compromised auditors. 
Principles-based accounting may work well in other corporate governance 
systems or in the US system at some future time. But Congress and the SEC 
move too quickly in prodding FASB to move immediately to principles-based 
GAAP. Priorities here need to be ordered with more care. The incentive 
problems should be solved first through institutional reform that insulates the 
audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solves the adverse selection 
problems that otherwise impair performance of the audit function in the US. 
SOA, with its blank check agency delegation, merely starts the reform process. 
It does not take the concomitant and necessary step of reasserting professional 
standards. Broad brush reformulations of rules-based GAAP should follow only 
when institutional reforms have succeeded. 
This Article's subsequent sections proceed as follows. Section 2 traverses 
the US reporting crisis, situating the rules versus principles debate in the 
context of recent audit failures. The discussion shows that the wave of audit 
failures implicates principles-based GAAP much more than it implicates rules-
based GAAP. A story about Enron much in circulation also is falsified. 
According to the story, Enron exemplifies the abuses of rules-based accounting 
under GAAP and demonstrates the need to move to principles. In reality, Enron 
violated whatever accounting standards got in its way, whether structured as 
rules or principles. Responsibility for the disaster does not lie at the door of the 
drafters of GAAP but at the door or those responsible for implementation and 
enforcement, Enron's managers and auditors. Section 3 explains why GAAP, 
which in fact is founded on principles, has evolved towards articulation in rules. 
The responsibility lies less with FASB, which has been operating as a 
1.' The effects of industry concentration are a matter of debate. For the view that intense price 
competition among audit firms has contributed to low audit quality, see text accompanying n. 65 
i nfi·o. 
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responsive regulator, than with its constituents. The constituents, the preparers 
and auditors of financial statements, demand rules. Adverse selection problems 
in their professional relationships motivate the demands. Section 4 compares 
rules and principles in the second-best world of US audit practice. Rules hold 
out cost savings and can enhance transparency. Principles make things simpler 
and enhance the comparability of financial statements across different firms. 
The problem is that principles presuppose an independent auditor who holds 
unmitigated professional power over the client and its treatment choices. In the 
absence of such an actor, the case for a principles-based regime rests on a false 
premise and holds out risks for audit quality. Section 5 concludes. 
2. RULES, PRINCIPLES, AND AUDIT FAILURE 
Proponents of principles-based accounting blame audit failures and reporting 
defalcations at firms like Enron and W orldCom on rules-based accounting and 
look to principles-based reformulations as a corrective tool. The rules, they say, 
are manipulated by managers, auditors, and consultants toward the end of 
reporting misstatement. A principles-based system, such as presently in effect 
in the United Kingdom and in IFRS, would be less manipulable and thus 
superior. No one challenges these assertions. But, as the discussion that follows 
shows, the charges are in significant part unfounded. This is not because GAAP 
contains no manipulable rules, for it does. Nor is this because the rules have not 
been manipulated, for they have been. It is because recent corporate scandals 
for the most part do not stem from rule manipulation. There is no persuasive 
causal connection between rule-based GAAP and recent, catastrophic audit 
failures. Enron, thought to be the prime case where corporate failure can be tied 
to rule exploitation, turns out to be much more a case of human pathology than 
of poor standard setting. 
2.1 Standard setting and audit failure 
According to the SEC's report under SOA on principles-based accounting, 
rules-based standards are characterized by 'bright line tests, multiple excep-
tions, a high level of detail, and internal inconsistencies.' A rules-based 
approach, moreover, seeks to supply a clear answer to every possible situation, 
thereby minimizing the need to apply professional judgment. 16 According to 
GAAP' s critics, this leads to transaction structuring and other strategic 
"' SEC Report, op. cit. n. 13, s. I.C. 
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behaviour that undermines the quality of financial reporting. 17 Financials thus 
manipulated, while rule compliant, do not truly and fairly state the reporting 
company's income and financial position. Comparability suffers as a result: 
Reporting entities hewing to the same strict standard appear comparable on 
faces of their financials when their arrangements in fact are dissimilar. 1 ~ Princi-
ples, say the critics, avoid this reporting pathology and lead to higher quality 
reporting; an effective system of accounting standards must build on principles 
and cannot be constructed entirely of rules. 
The critics are right that effective accounting standards must have a basis in 
~ ~ 
principles. Unfortunately for the line of criticism. however, GAAP exemplifies 
just such a system. GAAP is not comprised solely or rules, although some of its 
directives are indeed set out in elaborately stated rules replete with bright-line 
tests, multiple exceptions, and internal inconsistencies. Many GAAP standards 
are principles-based. Furthermore, a collection or broad and powerful princi-
ples stands behind the whole. 1" FASB, upon its inception in 1973, articulated 
,- K. Schipper. 'Principles-Based Accounting Standards', 17 Accoullfing Hori::.ons (2003) p. 61. 
"Ibid .. p.67. 
'" These are. according to a leading legal accounting text. historical cost. objectivity (or 
verifiability), revenue recognition. matching, consistency. full disclosure. and relevance (or fair 
value). D.R. Herwitz and M.J. Barrett, Accounting for Lawyers: Moteriols. 3"' edn. (New York, 
Foundation 2002) pp. 67-70. The last principle on the list. fair value. lately has been growing in 
importance at the expense of the first two on the list. historical cost and verifiability. See 
generally Financial Accounting Standards Board, Preliminory Views 011 Major Issues Reloted to 
Reporting Financial instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value ( 1999); 
S. SiegeL 'The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the Funda-
mental Principle of GAAP', 42 Warne L. Rc1·. ( 1996) p. 1839. Tension results- there is no way to 
have a system requiring verifiable numbers and at the same time offering fair value figures. That 
tension is being resolved in favour of fair value as GAAP moves away from a mandate that all 
reported numbers be hard numbers toward a system including many numbers that result from 
judgment calls but that in theory offer a better picture of the present value of the firm. Note that 
SOA s. 108(a) directs FASB to prioritize the consideration of new rules reflecting 'emerging 
accounting principles and changing business practices.' This presumably means more movement 
to fair value treatments. The Congress overlooks the fact that the same movement certainly 
played a role in the accounting mess at Enron, where mark to market and fair value accounting of 
its derivative and energy contracts contributed mightily to .~uspicions about its earnings figures. 
See F. Partnoy. Tcstinwnr Bc/(Ju' the Senate Conuuillce 011 Gm•ernmcmal Affirirs (SSRN 
working paper IIA Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May''. available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjd=417261 > (last visited 26 January 2004) 11. 
Common sense indicates that we should readjust the balance in favour of verifiability. at least 
until the crisis has passed. 
Other tensions come into the picture when we reference two modifying conventions-materi-
ality. which lets the auditor disregard minor misapplications of the rules, and conservatism. 
which counsels understatement in case or doubt. Between historical cost. verifiability. and 
conservatism on the one hand, and fair value and materiality on the other. there is much room for 
good faith dispute about the best way to state a firm's results. 
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GAAP's basic principles in a series of Concepts Statements,20 collectively 
called the conceptual framework. This has ever since been the source of the 
objectives and concepts drawn on in the development of US accounting 
standards. 21 The overarching concept in the conceptual framework is 'decision 
usefulness'. It is in tum supported by the trio of relevance, reliability, and 
comparability. 22 Decision usefulness is achieved in the first instance through 
comparability. That is, similar transactions and conditions should be reported 
the same way by different firms and by each firm across time. The achievement 
of comparability in tum necessitates standard setting. Relevance and reliability 
come into the framework at this point to assist the standard setter in articulating 
requirements for recognition of income, measurement of assets and liabilities, 
and disclosure more generally. 23 As articulated within the conceptual 
framework, GAAP is explicitly principles-based, even as it contains many 
rules. 
A critic might respond that other accounting systems manage to do as good a 
job as does US GAAP with materially greater reliance on principles than on 
rules. The UK regime often is held out at this point. As to auditing standards, the 
UK system does appear to be more principles-based than those in the US.24 But 
the picture is less clear with respect to the UK's substantive accounting princi-
ples. British accounting rests on eight Financial Reporting Standards, twenty-
five Statements of Standard Accounting Practice, plus a thick supplementary 
literature. Much of this is as dense and rule-bound as US GAAP.25 The same is 
true of IFRS.26 One commentator, reviewing a number of systems for relative 
rule-based complexity, including those of the US, the UK and IFRS, found no 
obvious reason to distinguish US GAAP as a pathological outlier. 27 All 
accounting systems mix rules and principles. 
More importantly, there is no clear causal connection between rules-based 
US GAAP and recent high-profile reporting failures. Those who denounce 
GAAP for excessive reliance on rules cite a number of subject matters. These 
2° For FASB' s discussion of these in the context of the principles based accounting movement 
of 2002, see FASB, Principles-Based Approach to U.S. Standard Setting, No. 1125-001 (21 
October 2002) pp. 5-7 [hereafter cited as FASB, Principles Approach]. 
21 See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1, Objective of Financial 
Reporting by Business Enterprises (November 1978). 
22 See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics 
of Accounting Information (1980). 
2) Schipper, loc. cit. n 17, pp. 62-63. 
2~ See C.A. Frost and K.P. Ramin, 'International Accounting Differences', 181 J. Acct. 
(1996) p. 62. 
25 L.W. Cunningham, 'The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It 
Just Might Work)', 35 Conn. L. Rev. (2003) pp. 915, 975-76. 
'" See SEC Report, op. cit n. 13, s. I.F. 
27 Cunningham, loc. cit. n. 25, p. 976 n. 291. 
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core, rules-based regimes include accounting for derivatives and hedging 
activity, leasing, real estate sales, stock-based compensation arrangements, 
consolidation (or other recognition) of related entity financial assets and liabili-
ties, and, prior to reforms instituted in 2002,"x mergers and acquisitions. 29 The 
General Accounting Office's (GAO) recent report of public company 
accounting restatements permits us to gauge the extent to which these rules-
based subject matter figures into the spate of accounting failures. Since 
accounting restatements presuppose audit failure, the GAO's compendium 
provides a roadmap to accounting's abused territories. 
The GAO report shows that the annual number of restatements rose from 92 
in 1997 to 225 in 2001. From 1997 to June 2002, the total number of restate-
ments announced was 919.10 These involved 845 companies, amounting ten per 
cent of all those listed on public exchanges in the US. Issues involving revenue 
recognition, whether in respect of misreportcd or nonreported revenue, made up 
the largest group by subject matter category, accounting for almost 38 per cent 
of the 919 restatements." The second largest group concerned cost or expense-
related issues, accounting for almost 16 per cent.,. The GAAP revenue and cost 
recognition standards bearing on this 54 per cent majority group are for the 
most part principles-based - they are phrased in general terms and require 
significant exercises of judgment in their application.'' WorldCom is the most 
famous recent case of these principles' opportunistic misuse. Over three years 
WorldCom shifted around $8 billion or line costs over to asset accounts, 
treating operating expenditures as capital expenditures, with earnings for the 
period of the shift increasing dollar for dollar. This age-old ruse for padding 
earnings implicated neither high-tech engineering nor manipulation of complex 
rules. 1" It was a bad faith application of a principle. 
The remaining restatements cover a range of subject matter, some of it rules-
based, but most of it principles-based. On the rules-based side are restatements 
'' See FASB, Statement (){Financial Accounting Standards No. 141. Business Combinations 
(June 200 I) (ending pooling treatment for mergers). 
''' SEC Report, op. cit. n. 13, ss. I.G.li.B. 
30 GAO Report, op. cit. n 4. 
" Ibid. 
32 Ibid. These types of restateinents include instances of in1proper cost recognition, tax issues, 
and other cost-related improprieties that led to financial misstatements. 
'·' Herwitz & Barrett, op. cit. n. 19. pp. 449-462. 474-482. The general principles are supple-
mented by industry specific rules. The door for this supplementation is opened by FASB 
Concepts Statement No.5, which bases the revenue recognition standards on the closing practices 
of its time. But it provides little further conceptual basis. FASB has a cuJTent project that looks 
toward a conceptual restatement. See Schipper, Joe. cit. n 17. p. 63. 
'" For description of this fraud, see Cunningham, op. cit. n. 25. pp. 934-36. 
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concerning merger and acquisition accounting and derivatives.35 More on the 
principles-based side lie restatements involving in-process research and devel-
opment, related-party transactions, loan-loss reserves and loan write-offs, asset 
impairment, inventory valuation, and restructuring activity. 36 
There is a simple reason why rules-based subject matters do not dominate the 
list of restatements: Detailed rules hold out roadmaps both to GAAP compli-
ance and the identification of GAAP noncompliance. Observers who disap-
prove of the rules-based treatments37 dislike the reporting destinations to which 
the roadmaps lead. Since these destinations tend simultaneously to be favoured 
by the managers of reporting companies, the managers happily comply with the 
rules. At the same time, a noncomplying issuer is more likely to confront an 
uncooperative auditor. Detailed rules hold out the benefit of enhancing trans-
parency even as they can distort the overall story told by the report's bottom 
line. They make it easier to see what companies are doing, if only for the reason 
that the precise instructions narrow the room for differences of judgment.'x 
Rules also ease verification. Detailed instructions provide a base of common 
assumptions and knowledge for both preparers and auditors. Differences in 
measurement decrease as a result. Noncompliance becomes more evident.39 
And the auditor who discovers noncompliance is more likely to refuse to let it 
pass given a rule. The rule provides it a clear-cut basis for justifying the refusal 
to the client, minimizing potential damage to the professional relationship. 
Since the rule makes noncompliance more visible, it also increases the risk of ex 
post enforcement respecting the preparer and the auditor both, further 
strengthening the auditor's resolve. 
35 GAO Report, Joe. cit. n. 4. Derivatives are a growth item on the list of restatements. Along 
with other securities-related restatements, they increased from 4.6 per cent of restatements in 
200 I to 12.4 per cent of restatements in the first half of 2002. But the category is capacious, and 
includes errors and misstatements involving derivatives, warrants, stock options, and other 
convertible securities. Some of the standards in question are rules-based, while others are 
standards-based. Significantly, most involve fair value accounting. 
"' Ibid. 
37 See M.W. Nelson, J.A. Elliott, and R.L. Tarpley, 'Where Do Companies Attempt Earnings 
Management, and When Do Auditors Prevent It?' This working paper is available at <http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=248129> (last visited 26 January 2004) (showing 
that auditors pass on these treatments as GAAP compliant). 
'' As noted above, to the extent the rule strategic transaction design, comparability may be 
lost as dissimilar transactions receive common treatment. Schipper, Joe. cit. n. 17, pp. 67-68. 
·'" See ibid., p. 68. 
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2.2 Enron and GAAP 
Those who ascribe rules-based standards with a causal role in the accounting 
crisis point to Enron. At first glance the citation appears justified. Misleading 
accounting treatments of transactions between Enron and off-balance sheet 
entities lie at the scandal's core, and the applicable accounting standards are 
rules-based. Indeed, these rules' form over substance treatments are as notori-
ously arbitrary as any in US GAAP. 
Criticism of these rules has been widespread for decades. Even FASB 
consistently has joined the critics. For two decades prior to 2001 it kept open a 
project inquiring into an alternative approach built on a principles-based defini-
tion of control.~0 Unfortunately for FASB, the business community, particularly 
the securitization industry, had come to rely on its mastery and manipulation of 
these rules, especially the labyrinthine set on transfers to off-balance sheet 
entities. The industry interests vociferously opposed reform. Exhausted by the 
opposition, FASB abandoned the project of substantive restatement as a failure 
even as the Enron scandal was breaking. Later, in the wake of the scandal, 
FASB's critics did an about face, suddenly demanding principles-based reform. 
FASB responded by reviving the reform project, and has since produced a 
succession of Enron-responsive exposure drafts. 11 FASB's revived reform 
project amounts to a tacit admission of standard setting failure. For all that 
appears, even the body responsible for GAAP agrees that its rules had a 
causative role in the company's collapse. 
In acting out the role of a deficient lawmaker, FASB confirms the conven-
tional wisdom circulating in the wake of Enron's collapse. This story follows 
from the assumption that a disaster of this magnitude never could have occurred 
had there not been a tlaw in the rules. The story has it that Enron exploited 
technical rules governing Special Purpose Entities (SPE) in setting up and 
accounting for sham transactions. By carefully but cynically hewing to the 
rules, Enron managed materially to overstate its earnings. Had the rules been 
better drafted, Enron would have been forced to consolidate the results of the 
"" See FASB. Consolidated Financial Statements: Purpose and Policy (proposed 23 
February 1999). 
11 FASB, Consolidation of' Certain Special Purpose Entities- an lntCipretation of ARB No. 
51 (proposed I July 2002). This draft deals with SPEs and would have caused the consolidation of 
Enron' s LJM I and 2. It also increases the outside equity requirement to ten per cent for a residual 
class of SPEs that would have included those in question. A second initiative addresses disclo-
sures of guarantees. on the purport that the present rules lack clarity. FASB,Interpretation No. 45, 
Guarantor's Accounting Disclosure Requirements ./(1r Guarantees, Including Indirect Guaran-
tees of Indebtedness of' Others (25 November 2002). 
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sham SPEs with its own results. Consolidation in turn would have deprived 
Enron of the opportunity to misstate its earnings. 42 
Generalizing from the story, rules-based GAAP's layers of precise instruc-
tions easily can be manipulated by clever and expensive accountants and 
lawyers. Had GAAP taken a principles-based approach, articulating general 
and substantive standards respecting the consolidation of related entities, there 
would have been no loophole through which the bad actors at Enron could have 
driven their fleet of sham SPE trucks. 
The story is accurate in one respect: the rules respecting accounting for trans-
actions with SPEs were badly drafted and incomplete. But in all other respects 
the story is nonsense. Enron, in fact, did not follow the rules. Had it done so, the 
substance of all of its questionable dealings with SPEs would have been 
disclosed in its financial statements. It follows that the rules did not fail. The 
failure lay with actors at Enron and its auditor, Arthur Anderson. Failures at 
F ASB played no role. F ASB' s implicit, after the fact, admission of a rule failure 
tells us more about its weakness as a political player than it does about the 
operation of GAAP.41 
It is true that the SPE transactions at the heart of the Enron scandal emerged 
from an exhaustive and strategic planning process. It also is true that the trans-
actions were designed to comply with the rules even as they exploited the rules' 
structural weaknesses. Under SFAS No. 140, issued in 2000, transfers of 
financial assets to SPEs are treated as sales by the transferor firm so long as, 
among other things, equity interests in the SPEare not returned as consideration 
for the assets transferred and the SPE gets control of the assets with the right to 
pledge or exchange them.44 For the class of SPEs utilized in the Enron transac-
tions, all the planner had to do was make sure that an outside equity investor in 
the SPE vehicle contributed capital at least equal to three per cent of the value of 
the financial assets transferred to the SPE vehicle by Enron. 
It also is true that at the time Enron set up the critical 'LJM I' and 'LJM II' 
SPEs and entered into swap transactions with them, the transactions arguably 
~ 2 One finds this story casually mentioned as accepted wisdom in the pages of the New York 
Times at the end of 2002. See K. Eichenwald, 'A Higher Standard for Corporate Advice', N.Y. 
Times (23 December 2002) pp. A 1, A 20 (quoting Professor Frank Partnoy as follows: 'Enron was 
following the letter of the law in nearly all of its deals. It is fair to say that the most serious allega-
tions of criminal wrongdoing at Enron had almost nothing to do with the company's collapse. 
Instead it was the type of transaction that is still legal.'). 
" Significantly, reporting companies and the big accounting firms (notably including 
Andersen and Enron, see G.R. Simpson, 'Deals That Took Enron Under Had Many Supporters', 
ll'u/1 ,\'t. J. ( 10 April2002) pp. A I, A 13), vigorously opposed FASB's consolidation project, criti-
l'llllll! the FASB's draft as unworkable. S. Burkholder, 'Accounting: Outlook 2002', 34 Sec. Reg . 
• ~ /.. f<t'fl. (2002) pp. 214, 215. 
" F/\SB. Summary of Statement No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of 
Ill til II< iu/ /Isseis and Extinguishments of Liabilities (September 2000). 
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complied with the rules. But, as subsequent investigations have detailed at 
length, the transaction structures had intrinsic flaws and went out of compliance 
with the three per cent rule very soon after the transactions closed.•" Had Enron 
scrupulously followed the rules at that point, it would have been forced to 
consolidate the SPEs into its financials. Had the SPEs been consolidated, the 
outcomes of the swap transactions between Enron and the SPEs would have 
been eliminated from Enron's income statement with the result that Enron 
would not have been able to pump up its net earnings with revenues and gains 
from SPE transactions. But, of course, the financials were not consolidated and 
Enron overstated its earnings by $1 billion over five quarters. But the noncom-
pliance did not result from the successful manipulation of flawed rules. Instead, 
like Parmalat's managers on the other side of the Atlantic, Enron's managers 
resorted to the old fashioned expedient of concealment. 
Enron's financials would have been out of compliance with GAAP even if 
the financials' treatment of its swaps with LJM had conformed to the rules on 
consolidation of financials. Consolidation was not the only compliance 
problem implicated by the LJM transaction structure. Under SFAS No. 57, 
contracts between Enron and the LJM SPEs were 'related party transactions'. 
This category includes transactions with a counterparty whose policies are so 
intluenced by the first party as to prevent one of the parties from fully pursuing 
its own interests. Given such a tie, special footnote descriptions of the transac-
tions are required, including dollar amount impacts on reported earnings.H' The 
footnote disclosures would have provided investors with the substantive equiv-
alent of a set of consolidated reports. But, of course, Enron did not wish to make 
clear the truth respecting this component of its reported earnings, and its coop-
erative auditor failed to insist that it follow the rules on related party 
transactions. 
An additional reporting failure figured prominently in Enron' s final 
collapse. The straw that broke the camel's back, frustrated a last-ditch rescue 
plan, and forced the company to file for bankruptcy in December 200 I was 
Enron' s the last minute revelation of $4 billion of unreported contingent guar-
antees of obligations of unconsolidated equity affiliates. The revelation killed a 
bailout merger with Dynegy because the hidden $4 billion of obligations mate-
rially impaired Enron's financial condition and wne about to come due. 47 As to 
these obligations GAAP holds out a clear instruction. To guarantee an equity 
affiliate's obligations is to take the disclosure treatment out of the parent-
subsidiary or parent-investee context for treatment under the standards on 
'' W.C. Powers. Jr.. eta!.. 'Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of 
the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.' available at 2002 WL 198018 (2002) p. 98. 
"' FASB. Statement No. 57, Related Part\' Disclosures, paras. 2. 24(f) (March 1982). 
' Bratton, foe. cit. n. ::?.. pp. 1320-1325. 
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contingent losses. Those standards call for disclosure. Under SFAS No.5, loss 
contingencies are divided into three classes: probable, reasonably possible, and 
remote. Probable losses should be accrued as liabilities; reasonably possible 
losses should be disclosed in footnotes with information as to nature and 
magnitude; remote losses need not be disclosed. There is a separate rule for 
financial guarantees such as Enron's. With guarantees, even if the possibility of 
loss is remote, there must be footnote disclosure as to nature and amount.-+x 
Enron failed to make those disclosures because it was afraid that disclosure 
could trigger a rating agency downgrade to below investment grade status. 
(Enron needed an investment grade rating to run its trading business and did 
everything it could to maintain one). This included material understatement of 
its obligations as guarantor. This amounts to another old-fashioned fraud by 
concealment. It comes as no surprise that, thus stated, Enron' s financials did not 
comply with GAAP.49 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the central problem at Enron lay 
not with the rules themselves but with the company's failure to follow them. 
The Enron disaster stemmed not from the rules' structural shortcomings but 
from the corruption of Enron' s managers and perverse financial incentives that 
inclined its auditor towards cooperation. 
The conventional wisdom errs in a second respect as well. The story blames 
the complex rules on accounting for SPE transactions. It asserts that had F ASB 
adopted a principles-based approach to consolidation of related entity financial 
statements, Enron would have been disabled from perpetrating its fraud. Unfor-
tunately for the story, the complex rules governing SPEs in SFAS No. 140 
applied in full only to mainstream transactions, like the securitization of pools 
of mortgages. Enron's SPE transactions did not flow in the mainstream 
governed by SFAS No. 140. They instead fell into a category of 'other' SPE 
"" See FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingen-
cies (March 1975) para. 5: 'The Board concludes that disclosure of [guarantees of indebtedness of 
others and others that in substance have the same characteristic] shall be continued. The disclo-
sure shall include the nature and amount of the guarantee.' See also FASB, Interpretation No. 34, 
Disclosure of Indirect Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others (March 1981); Herwitz & Barrett, 
op. cit. n. 19, pp. 617-20. Note that under SFAS No. 140, a separate recourse obligation against 
the transferor of an asset to an SPE in respect of reimbursement for losses on the underlying 
portfolio (as opposed to a derivative arrangement) continues to be treated under SFAS No.5. That 
is, the transferor makes an ongoing assessment of the amount of the loss in its financials rather 
than adjusting the obligation to fair value and reporting it in income. Ernst & Young, Financial 
Reporting Developments; Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extin-
guishments of Liabilities- FASB Statement 140 (May 2001) p. 29. 
"" And therefore were per se misleading for securities law purposes. See 'Administrative 
Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Rel. No. 4', 11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (S.E.C. 
1938), codified in 'Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, s. 101', reprinted in 7 CCH Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. para. 72,921 (18 May 1988). 
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transactions not covered in their entirety by F ASB standard-setting. For trans-
actions in the residual category, the critical requirement was a minimum outside 
equity investment. As to this the accounting firms used a three per cent rule of 
thumb, derived from a 1991 letter of the Chief Accountant of the SEC issued in 
respect of a lease transaction."" To read the 1991 letter is to see that the SEC 
required three per cent outside equity funding on the facts of the leasing case 
presented to it. The agency never intended to set three per cent as a one-size-
fits-all, bright line test. During the 1990s, the SEC repeatedly pointed out to the 
accounting profession that no three per cent bright line test existed and that the 
level of outside equity funding for a qualifying SPE in the residual category 
should follow from the nature of the transaction. In the SEC's view, the 
question was whether, on the facts of the case, sufficient outside equity capital 
had been invested to assure the SPEs independence. 51 The outside equity 
requirement was thus intended not as a rule but as a flexible principle to be 
applied in the circumstances. But, despite the agency's jawboning, the 
accounting profession applied the principle as a three per cent bright line rule. 
That rule-based three per cent was the operative assumption when Enron 
planned the LJM transactions. 
A disturbing pattern of communicative breakdown and noncompliance 
emerges. A standard-setting agency articulates a principle and tells US auditors 
to apply it as such. The auditors instead bowdlerize the standard so that it 
operates as a check-the-box rule. At the level of practice, then, US auditors 
manufacture rules where rules do not exist. A number of questions follow. Why 
do US auditors display a refractory preference for rules? What prevents auditors 
from applying standards as intended? Will the behaviour pattern persist under 
the new principles-based regime projected by GAAP reformers? Responses to 
these questions follow in sections 3 and 4. 
2.3 Summary 
GAAP' s form and content do need improvement and take some of the blame for 
the US accounting crisis. There can be no denying that practitioners often take 
advantage of GAAP' s rule structures when they design aggressive treatments. 
Regulatory arbitrage - the practice of structuring an inappropriate transaction 
"' The GAAP authorities are EITF Topic D-14. 'Transactions involving Special Purpose 
I ~ntities', EITF 90-15, 'Impact of Nonsubstantive Lessors. Residual Value Guarantees and Other 
Provisions in Leasing Transactions'. and EITF 96-2 I, 'Implementation Issues in Accounting for 
I .casing Transactions involving Special Purpose Entities'. 
'' See D.J. Ragone III, 'Cunent Accounting Projects'. 2000 Cm!f'erence on SEC Develop-
llll'llfs (4 December 2000). 
24 William W. Bratton EBOR 5 (2004) 
so it stays just within the bounds set by a rule 52 - clearly is widespread. But these 
rule-based aggressive treatments, which tend to involve structured finance, 
leases, and (until recently) pooled mergers, do not show up in large numbers on 
the list of recent restatements. The reason is that the rules make the treatments 
GAAP-compliant, even as many observers disapprove of the treatments. 
The audit failures and restatements follow less from regulatory arbitrage 
than from strategic noncompliance action under an interpretation of the law in 
conflict with the stated interpretation of the regulator. 53 Neither rules nor 
standards prevent such conduct, and, as between the two, rules have the 
advantage in deterring it. Meanwhile, in every case of a restatement, GAAP by 
definition has proved adequate to the job of identifying the misstatement and 
providing corrective instructions. Under this analysis, the drafters of SOA were 
right in thinking that the absence of principles has contributed to the crisis but 
wrong in diagnosing the problem as legislative. This is not for the most part a 
problem concerning the relative merits of rules and principles in standard 
setting. It is instead a problem of professional practice in a regulatory system 
made up of both. It is the auditors who need to get back to principles, taking 
seriously principles already governing the reporting system. 
3. THE DEMAND FOR RULES 
We have seen that US GAAP literally follows from general principles. Yet it 
has become more and more rules-based as articulated over time. This is not 
because its general principles no longer motivate particular GAAP standards, 
but because US accounting's constituents constantly and effectively register 
demands for tailored treatments. The propensity toward rules follows from a 
supply and demand dynamic between the standard-setter, F ASB, the audit 
firms, and their management clients. 
The demand for rules follows from auditing clients' constant desire for 
exception from rules. When an accounting principle articulates a treatment 
category and a set of reporting companies dislike the way the treatment applies 
to them, they (and their auditors) lobby for an exception. One means to the end 
of permitted deviation from the mandated treatment is a 'scope exception' a 
rule that rule excludes stated transactions or items. 54 GAAP's complex deriva-
tive rules provide a good example, with their nine exceptions to the definition of 
derivative, several of which came into the rules solely for the purpose of 
52 See T.F. Malloy, 'Regulation and the Compliance Norm', UCLA Law School working 
paper, 2003 (on file with author). 
53 Ibid. 
54 Schipper, Joe. cit. n. 17, pp. 66-67. 
Rules, Principles, and the American Accounting Crisis 25 
reducing preparation costs.:" Alternatively, constituents request and attain 
'treatment exceptions' -special rules for defined items or industry practices. 
Rules facilitating income smoothing provide a prominent example.'~> Having 
won their rule-based exceptions, the constituents then request detailed instruc-
tions respecting implementation.'7 FASB responds, and GAAP becomes still 
more complex. 
3.1 F ASB: the responsive standard setter 
GAAP has very close formative ties to the profession that applies it, ties closer 
even than those between US legislatures and judges and the legal professionals 
who advise corporate clients. Government mandates dictate much of the advice 
lawyers give to clients. But the government, although heavily populated with 
lawyers, operates at arm's length from the legal profession. Accounting, in 
contrast, operates like a guild both at the legislative and at the professional 
level. Auditors apply law generated within their own profession, operating at 
closer quarters with the pertinent lawmaking institutions than do lawyers. 
The governance structure of FASB demonstrates this proximity. At first 
glance it appears designed to prevent the large auditing firms from dominating 
the body that makes GAAP. Public accountants may fill no more than three of 
FASB's seven seats, with the remaining four seats being taken by two corporate 
executives, one financial analyst, and one academic."x On further consideration, 
however, the four to three split does not provide a credible guarantee against 
special interest influence. Auditors and corporate audit clients will have a 
community of interest on most hot button standard setting issues. F ASB, by 
coupling three auditors with two corporate executives, assures that this 
community of interest has a five-to-two voting advantage. FASB also is a very 
small shop, with a staff of only forty-five. For funding, it has historically relied 
on the charitable support of the large audit firms, along with a trickle of 
revenues from publication sales.'') Add all of this up, and the structure does not 
guarantee robust institutional independence for GAAP' s standard setter. 
With this incentive problem in mind, let us revisit FASB's withdrawal of its 
two decades old project looking toward a substance-over-form approach to 
~~ Ibid. p. 66. 
"' Ibid. 
57 Ibid, p. 67. 
s}\ Herwitz & Barrett, op. cit. n. 19, pp 154-156. 
''' Ibid .. p. 54. Meanwhile. the Emerging Issues Task Force, which since 1984 has had the job 
of pronouncing on cutting-edge requests for advice on appropriate treatments, is a group 
populated almost entirely of representatives of the large firms. Ibid. p. 157. 
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defining control and imposing consolidation.60 Why did FASB give up? It 
seems unlikely that the decision followed from a jurisprudential commitment to 
rules-based accounting. More likely F ASB abandoned the project because it 
expected a shift to a standard to trigger vociferous opposition from reporting 
companies and the large audit firms because it would have had a restraining 
effect on the structured finance. Securitization is a billion dollar industry. 
Auditing firms participate as consultants. Reporting companies securitize their 
assets to enhance their bottom lines. Market intermediaries draw enormous 
revenues from making the deals. To the extent that a new consolidation regime 
would have chilled deals by changing accounting treatments, all of these actors 
would have gone straight to the barricades to protect the status quo. FASB, after 
years of being greeted with threats from lobbyists and attack dog congressmen 
whenever it tried to improve anything, was entitled to be a little gun shy in the 
face of strong demand for the status quo respecting consolidation. 
It should be noted that corporate managers do not have the power simply to 
dictate GAAP's terms. GAAP rule-makings are much contested, despite 
F ASB' s structural weakness and management's capture of the auditor interest. 
Indeed, FASB has conducted itself with admirable independence in recent 
years, taking positions opposed to those of management and the audit profes-
sion on key issues like the treatment good will arising in mergers and manage-
ment stock options. 61 But FASB's structural weakness does bear on the rules 
versus principles choice in day-to-day standard setting. When empowered 
constituents present F ASB with a standard-setting problem or pose a question 
about a proposed standard, in either case asking for a solution in the form of a 
scope or treatment exception, they often get a sympathetic hearing. 
US GAAP accordingly presents a cognisable capture problem. GAAP in 
many respects results from an internal conversation, with no institutional 
mechanism assuring that the public interest trumps the interests of audit firms 
and their clients in its promulgation. Asymmetries of information and method-
ological wherewithal aggravate the problem. GAAP is a body of law structur-
ally shielded from outside inspection. Monitoring GAAP is difficult - to know 
what is going on respecting substantive issues in accounting is to be a member 
of the guild in the first place. 
Solidarity within the accounting profession aggravates the problem. This 
profession closes ranks when a major conflict breaks out between it and the rest 
of the economy. Among the multitude of talking heads from the business world 
that provided the US media with its sound bites during recent corporate crises, 
none were partners from the large auditing firms. Even as the rough and tumble 
60 See supra n. 40 and accompanying text. 
61 A. Levitt, Take On the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don't Want You to 
Know, What You Can Do to Fight Back (New York: Random House 2002) pp. 106-115. 
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world of public policy discussion suddenly occupied itself with GAAP and the 
audit profession, the audit firms stayed silent.62 The silence hardly stemmed 
from disinterest. It instead served to preserve information asymmetry - the less 
said about audit practice outside the profession the better. Industry concentra-
tion augments accounting's professional solidarity. There remain only four 
firms left with the wherewithal to conduct audits of large capitalization 
companies. In a universe of four organizations, discipline is easily maintained. 
The legal profession in the US, with all its faults, displays no comparable 
solidarity. For every lawyer who closes ranks with a corporate client, there is 
another lawyer looking to bring suit against that first lawyer's client, or, alterna-
tively, to get the legislature to authorize a lawsuit. When the corporation's 
lawyer goes to Capitol Hill to get the client protective legislation, the trial 
lawyers also are there, working the other side. When lawyers advocate for their 
clients in public, they are understood to be acting in a special role. Any repre-
sentations they make on clients' behalf concerning the state of the law are 
greeted with scepticism. Indeed, critique usually is assured, for a second lawyer 
will be charged with articulating the opposing view. 
Accountants operate differently as a profession; even as they have come 
more and more resemble lawyers in playing an advocacy role for their clients. 
Where with lawyers the advocacy appears in briefs and memoranda of law, with 
accounting the advocacy merges into the numbers reported on the clients' 
certified financials. Readers of financial reports have not been on notice to 
bring scepticism to bear, at least until very recently. And those who do proceed 
cautiously get only indirect means within the reports' four corners with which 
to sort numbers influenced by advocacy from harder numbers uninfluenced by 
management's agenda. This does not go to say that financial reports always are 
taken at face value. In theory, Wall Street's financial analysts play the critical 
function. Unfortunately, in recent practice they too have lacked the incentive to 
criticize.''1 Nor can we assume that a vigorous critique will emanate from within 
the accounting profession, for it has no segment with a financial stake in articu-
lating adversary positions. The entire burden of critique and correction has 
devolved on FASB, the SEC accounting office, 64 and a handful of academics. 
''' We must put to one side Arthur Andersen's Joe Berardino, who publicly and unsuccess-
fully acted out the role of the CEO trying to quell an organizational conflagration. 
"
3 The incentive problem stems from underw1iting and other rent streams flowing from the issuers 
of financial rep01ts to the employers of analysts. It is not clear that the problem admits of an easy 
solution. Absent that conupting rent flow, it is not clear that resources exist to supp01t an adequate 
llow of c!itical analysis. Restating the point. reform implies a new pricing structure for the audit. 
''' The SEC had the power to impose accounting rules prior to SOA. See 15 U.S.C. ss. 77(a). 
nm(b )(I) ( 1994 ). The SEC exercises its power only rarely, preferring to leave the job to FASB. 
;1cting under the threat of intervention should the SEC's preferences not be satisfied. Herwitz & 
Barrett, op. cit. n. 19. p. 146. 
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3.2 Audit Firm Demands 
Auditors are inclined toward cooperation with their clients and will tend to 
support their clients' reporting objectives. Competition for consulting business 
aggravates the inclination. Auditors also are disinclined to say no to their 
clients. It follows that before so doing they will seek the backing of a precise 
negative instruction in GAAP. The rule denudes the negative response to the 
client of any suggestion that the nay-saying stems from the auditor's own 
professional judgment. The external authority takes the blame. Under the 
prevailing relational pattern, audit clients balk at negative auditor demands 
absent a precise written justification: 'Show me where it says I can't do this.'"' 
This professional dynamic generates a high demand for rules. 
The profession's fear of enforcement entanglement strengthens the prefer-
ence. With an open-ended principle, both the preparer and the auditor make a 
judgment respecting a law to fact application. Risk averse actors in this posture 
will be wary of second-guessing by regulatory authorities."(' They fear that the 
good faith they bring to the principle's application will be unverifiable ex post. 
Principles, then, make it hard to minimize enforcement risk. 
It follows that a high demand for rules could persist even in the wake of an 
across the board ban on nonaudit consulting. Recall that the 'check-the-box' 
allegation against rules-based GAAP can be restated in positive terms: Rules 
enhance verifiability, causing a decrease in differences in measurement and 
making non-compliance more evident. Now assume, as some assert,"7 that the 
audit firms engage in intense price competition (even as the number of firms 
equipped to audit large capitalization companies has decreased to four and quite 
apart from competition for consulting rents). Such price competition could 
come at the cost of audit quality. To see why, hypothesize the incentives of an 
audit partner under pricing pressure. Under Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards, the audit process begins with an appraisal of the risk of compliance 
failure at the client. The auditor's professional judgment concerning the scope 
of the testing to be conducted in the course of the audit follows from this risk 
appraisal.(,x The scope of the testing in turn impacts on the audit fee- as the risk 
increases, more tests are needed, more time must be spent, and the fee rises. 
Rules recommend themselves over principles in a hard cash sense at this point 
in the scenario. Check-the-box verifiability gets the job done more quickly and 
''
5 SEC Report, op. cit. n. 13, s. III.I. 
"" See ibid., s. I.C. 
"
7 SeeS. Sunder, 'Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing', Yale ICF Working 
Paper No. 03-17 (29 May 2003) (available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=413581>) (last visited 26 January 2004). 
"' Herwitz & Banett, op cit. n. 19, pp. 200-203. 
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predictably, making it easier to state a price in advance and lock in a profit on 
the engagement. Under a regime of principles, the preparer will have made fact 
sensitive applications of the standards, necessitating a more labour-intensive 
audit. With principles, unexpected, time-consuming problems also are more 
likely to arise. In sum, professional price competition, to the extent it exists, 
also fuels the demand for rules. 
3.3 The legal profession compared 
US auditors, in demanding rules from their standard setter, track the actions of 
'-' 
US lawyers; and US GAAP, in evolving away from broad principles toward 
rules, tracks the evolution of US business law as a whole. Before telling their 
clients that a course of action is prohibited, lawyers also seek an explicit 
statutory bar or a case on all fours. Business law and lawyers no longer 
subscribe to the legal realists' view that fact specific adjudication under princi-
ples makes law more responsive.(>'' As an example, compare the old Uniform 
Partnership Act, 7" drafted early in the twentieth century, with a Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act, 71 drafted at the end of the century. The former is a 
collection of short, general statements. The latter is a labyrinthine affair that 
reads like an attempt to answer every question that ever arose in this history of 
partnership governance. The evolution of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) and the cases thereunder over the last three decades has worked 
similarly. New legislative drafts of the UCC add layers of complications. 
Today's drafters no longer leave it to later case law to fill in the details. Instead 
they pursue the impossible dream of creating complete sets of instructions, just 
like the accountants. 72 Meanwhile, courts applying the UCC have abandoned 
general ideas like liberal construction 71 and good faith. 7~ 
Many reasons for business law's movement to rules can be suggested. Confi-
dence in judicial decision-making has declined even as the expense of litigating 
questions of interpretation has risen. In commercial law contexts the scope of 
jury control over mixed law and fact questions expanded materially over the 
,,., See W.W. Bratton, 'Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn', 26 J.Corp.L. 
(200l)pp. 737,746. 
711 Uniform Partnership Act, 6 ULA 275 (1914). 
71 Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 6 ULA I (1997). 
72 Compare the original UCC Art. 9 and the revised Art. 9 on the perfection and priorities of 
security interests, See UCC ss. 9-301-9-318 3A ULA 859-1037. 3B ULA 33-386 ( 1972); UCC ss. 
9-301-9-342, 3 ULA 154-301 (2000). 
71 See G.E. Maggs, 'Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code', 7 J U. Colo. L. Rev. (2000) p. 541. 
7
' W.W. Bratton, 'Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control', 
100 Mich. L. Rev. (2002) pp. 891, 933-934. 
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latter part of the twentieth century, destabilizing the expectations of business 
people. There also circulates a general notion that specific instructions import 
certainty that enhances economic welfare. Finally, lawyers, like auditors, tum 
to rules because they want to reduce risk both for themselves and their clients. A 
rule imports a safe harbour and control of future events where a standard does 
not. 
To sum up, GAAP and business law have moved to rules simultaneously. 
Auditors, lawyers, and clients alike demand clear instructions, putting the 
burden of clarity on the lawmaker. They thereby relieve themselves of the 
burden of making judgments under uncertainty. Such judgments take time, cost 
money, and disrupt client relations. This is not a healthy development. But the 
fault lies neither in the proliferating rulebooks nor their drafters. The fault 
occurs at the point of demand: Drafters will continue to generate rulebooks until 
the demand ceases. Actors in practice will perceive the rulebooks to be inflex-
ible and burdensome only with the cessation of the forces generating the 
demand. 
4. RELATIVE MERITS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES: IDEAL CONDITIONS 
AND INCENTIVE INCOMPATIBILITY 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the auditor-client demand for 
greater rule specificity ceases, freeing us to interrogate in a neutral policy space 
the question whether GAAP should be articulated in rules or principles. The 
result will depend on the inquiry's further assumptions. If an ideal professional 
environment is hypothesized, in which the auditor works unconstrained by 
pressures of time, price, and reputation, a strong case can be stated for a princi-
ples-based regime. But a plausible case can be stated for rules even under such 
ideal conditions. The case for rules strengthens materially in an imperfect insti-
tutional framework, such as that prevailing respecting the audit function in the 
US. 
4.1 Cost savings and transparency 
Rules-based accounting entails cost savings and enhances transparency. The 
cost savings follow from the nature of the subject matter. Accounting standards 
govern homogenous, recurrent situations where the actors need ex ante instruc-
tions and have incentives to invest in compliance.75 Such conditions tend to 
justify a rules-based approach. An across-the-board shift to principles would 
" See L. Kaplow, 'Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis', 42 Duke L.J. (1992) 
pp. 557, 570-77. 
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make sense only if the costs of constant revision of the rules to keep up with 
unintended applications due to faulty drafting and regulatory arbitrage 
outweighed the benefits of advance specification. GAAP does not appear to lie 
anywhere near that level of dysfunction. On this analysis, the indicated course 
of reform is incremental change. The standard setter monitors the rules' 
operation looking to periodic amendment, adjusting categories so that reporting 
results follow from the rules' operative principles.76 
Transparency imports a second justification for rules. Recall that rule 
compliance is more easily verified than principle compliance.77 It follows that 
rules decrease the risk of audit failure even as they import inflexibility. 
Rules enhance transparency for users of financial statements as well as for 
auditors. To see why, revisit the legal realists' case for principles over rules in 
respect of private law adjudication. That case presupposes that the law to fact 
application is explained and published in a judicial opinion. The reported cases 
give the practitioner an expanding body of fact sensitive applications, ever 
better articulating the standard's meaning. Over time, the accumulated case law 
offers the practitioners a level of certainty not dissimilar to that of a rulebook, 
even as the principle's flexibility is retained. Meanwhile, the cases (and thus the 
substance of the legal regime) are open for public inspection. 
The ongoing rules-based arficulation of GAAP by F ASB and other public 
bodies works similarly.n But the application of open-ended accounting princi-
ples by reporting firms and auditors does not. Financial statements and 
footnotes are very summary documents. Decision making about treatments 
goes on in a black box, evolving as a matter of practice amongst insiders.70 
There is no comparable moment of transparency respecting the law to fact 
application. This diminishes the chance for outside evaluation. These law-to-
fact decisions, meanwhile, are not made by judges empowered by the state. 
They come from the preparers -the regulated actors themselves - acting with 
an input of the auditor's professional review. And a professional, even one 
historically conceived to be in an adversary posture to its client, is in a materi-
ally different position from a judge. Adjudicatory authority imports absolute 
'" The rule might be overinclusive; that is, it might bring inappropriate transactions into a 
given zone of treatment. A rule also might be underinclusive; that is, it might allow a transaction 
that should be included in a treatment category to be structured so as not to be included. See C.R. 
Sunstein, 'Problems With Rules', 83 Cal. L. Rev. (1995) pp. 953, 995. 
See text accompanying n. 37 supra. 
" According to FASB, any bias toward rules in contemporary GAAP stems from exactly this 
sort of law-to-fact development process, as rules are rewritten to take into account different 
transactional facts and interpretive opinions accumulate. FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 
20, pp. 3-4. 
'" The three per cent rule applied to SPEs provides a good example, see supra text accompa-
nying n. 50. 
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power to say no. The outside professional can only suggest no, on pain of giving 
up the client. 
When confronting substandard financials, today' s auditors are disinclined 
even to threaten to walk, much less actually to forego the rent flowing from the 
audit engagement. A serious incentive problem results, a problem that makes a 
move to flexible, open-ended principles ill advised at this time. 
4.2 Flexibility and professional judgment 
The case for principles-based accounting arises in large measure from the 
description of the perverse effects of rules. The principles case admits the force 
of the rules case but asserts that once rules come to dominate the accounting 
regime, cumulative perverse effects cause the disadvantages of rules to 
outweigh the advantages. The more detailed the set of exceptions, the greater 
the chance that essentially similar transactions receive different accounting 
treatments. Scope and treatment exceptions build inconsistencies into the 
standards, sacrificing the integrity of the underlying principles. Strategic 
behaviour results, as preparers seek to exploit the inconsistencies, designing 
compliant transactions that subvert the principles the rules supposedly effec-
tuate. Meanwhile, the proliferating exceptions fuel additional demand for expli-
cation from the standard setter. The responsive standard setter finds itself 
attempting to articulate a treatment for every conceivable scenario. But the 
attempt always fails, for the goal of a perfect, exhaustive rulebook is unattain-
able.80 
The case for principles at this point reverses the case for rules. Since the 
standard setter cannot identify all pertinent business situations ex ante, it is not 
clear why exhaustive instructions should be held out as a goal in the first place, 
given that micro-level standard setting always results in inconsistencies. The 
only party with all information respecting a given transaction is the reporting 
company itself. It follows that the company's preparer, operating in good faith, 
is more likely to derive an appropriate treatment when applying a principle than 
is a rulemaking standard setter acting ex ante. With principles, company-
specific knowledge and the regulatory framework interact flexibly and the 
regulation's purpose is more likely to be effectuated. 81 
Thus described, principles-based accounting not only permits but also 
requires exercises of professional judgment by auditors and actors at reporting 
companies. 82 Sir David Tweedie, chairman of the IASB, stressed the importance 
"' SEC Report, loc. cit. n. 13, s.I.C. 
Kl Ibid., s. I.D. 
" Schipper, loc. cit. n. 17, p. 61. 
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of professional judgment in a principles based system in his 2002 Congres-
sional testimony: 
'We favour an approach that requires the company and its auditor to take a step back 
and consider whether the accounting suggested is consistent with the underlying 
principle. This is not a soft option. Our approach requires both companies and their 
auditors to exercise professional judgment in the public interest. Our approach re-
quires a strong commitment from preparers to financial statements that provide a 
faithful representation of all transactions and a strong commitment from auditors to 
resist client pressures. It will not work without these commitments ... ,x, 
Having heard the case for principles, we must return to the auditor-client rela-
tionship to inquire into the expected quality or proressional judgments. If recent 
history is predictive, the prognosis is not good. Even as auditors have been 
disempowered with respect to their clients, so the clients have been guided by 
short-term solicitude for their stock prices rather than fidelity to accounting 
principles. Proponents of principles seem to believe that reformulating rules 
into standards by itself solves these problems. But the belief is unfounded. The 
recent history of audit failure has been no respecter of principles. It will take 
more than a new approach to standard setting bring incentive compatibility to 
this compliance environment. 
The SEC displays sensitivity to this problem in its SOA report on principles-
based accounting. The report's definition of an ideal principles-based standard 
makes an interesting comparison with Sir David Tweedie's approach: 
' ... [T]he optimal principles-based accounting standard involves a concise statement 
of substantive accounting principles where the accounting objective has been incor-
porated as an integral part of the standard and where few, if any, exceptions or inter-
nal inconsistencies are included in the standard. Further, such a standard should 
provide an appropriate amount of implementation guidance given the nature of the 
class of transactions or events and should be devoid of bright-line tests. Finally, such 
a standard should be consistent with, and derive from, a coherent conceptual frame-
work of financial reporting.''" 
Where Tweedie lays the responsibility for law to fact determinations squarely 
on the regulated actors, the SEC hesitates. It takes a step back from the case for 
principles to endorse constituent demand for specificity. It then shifts the 
burden back to the standard setter to provide 'an appropriate amount of 
" Testimony of Sir David Tweedie Before the Senate Committee on Banking. Housing and 
Urban Affairs ( 14 February 2002). 
" SEC Report, op. cit. n. 13. s. I.C. 
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implementation guidance.' Bald statements of principles, says the SEC, 
provide users insufficient structure in which to frame their professional 
judgment. The 'principles' need to be 'defined specifically.' The SEC calls this 
an 'objectives-oriented' approach to principles-based standard setting. As an 
exemplar, it holds out F ASB' s recent revision of the standard for mergers. 85 
The regime envisaged by the SEC appears to hold out the benefit of a 
decrease in the level of reporting detail. At the same time, comparability of 
treatment across different issuers would be enhanced. But the decrease in 
complexity implies a concomitant loss of transparency, since commonality of 
treatment obscures particulars in the economics of differing underlying transac-
tions. 86 The SEC sees these as matters to be traded off by the standard setter: 
'[T]he task of the standard setter [is] to determine the trade offs among 
relevance, reliability, and comparability( ... ) in( ... ) an effort to find the "sweet 
spot"' 87 • Two additional SEC instructions to the standard setter stand out: (1) 
economic substance should drive the development and scope of the standards,88 
and (2) no scope and treatment exceptions should be conceded. 89 
A question must be asked about the SEC's vision of accounting standards. 
How does the regime simultaneously articulate precise instructions and eschew 
all exceptions from its categories? So doing would amount to a considerable 
achievement. The drawing of lines is intrinsic to regulation. Line-drawing is 
what case law under principles is supposed to do. It is not at all clear that 
financial reporting principles differ from any other body of regulations in this 
regard. So, to the extent the SEC looks toward a new regime in which all 
standards mesh like the parts of a well-running machine, it is likely to be disap-
pointed. Such perfect engineering is no more likely here than in any other regu-
latory context.90 The search for 'sweet spots' is better consigned to sporting and 
other physical activities. 
The SEC, in its search for a regime of broadly stated standards that incorpo-
rate no exceptions, might be better off abandoning the rubric of principles-
based accounting. The system envisioned more accurately would be character-
ized as a one of tough, general rules. 91 Such a regime holds out advantages. For 
example, it presumably would prohibit whole classes of aggressive treatments 
tolerated in recent years, particularly those facilitating earnings management. 
But if this is the SEC's intent, a question arises: In the present political and 
ss Ibid, s. I.C, I.E. 
86 The comments in the text draw on FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20, p. 7. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid, s. IV.D. 
90 See FASB, Principles Approach, op. cit. n. 20, p 6. 
'" FASB' s Proposal respecting Principles in effect warns audit firms and issuers of this when 
it points out that principles will mean more volatility in reported earnings figures. Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
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institutional context how likely is it that reporting companies, their auditors, 
and their friends in Washington would permit FASB to use the rubric of princi-
ples-based accounting to usher in a new era of strict treatments? Even as the 
PCAOB takes steps to regulate the audit profession, the answer must be, very 
unlikely. 
As a practical matter, then, the projected move to principles will have to be 
articulated in the form of general but flexible guidelines - what lawyers call 
'standards. ,<Jc 
Choices of treatment will have to be made and the quality of preparer and 
auditor judgments will matter. The SEC warns that principles-based accounting 
implicates a more expensive, time-consuming audit process. The SEC antici-
pates that, in order to review preparer judgments, audit firms will have to hire 
expensive personnel with expertise in complex transactions. It also anticipates 
that active audit committee oversight and other strong enforcement agents will 
be required if the system is to work. Finally, it advises auditors and preparers to 
generate extensive paper records respecting treatment decisions so as to 
position themselves to defend their good faith.'13 
In effect the SEC asks users of financial statements to trust in the effective-
ness of the PCAOB to create a compliance environment very different from the 
one prevailing - a wonderful new world of accounting. The question is not 
whether the regime it projects would he an improvement on the status quo; it 
would be. The question is whether the ideal world thus projected is feasible in 
practice without unintended effects in the form of poor professional judgments. 
It is too soon in the US reform process for an atlirmative answer. 
5. CoNcLUSION 
US GAAP, even as it has moved to rules, continues to contain many principles 
and holds out many choices of treatment. Independent auditors are supposed to 
make reference to the principles in filling in the inevitable gaps in the rules and 
in answering questions of interpretation under the rules. Such law to fact appli-
cations should with some frequency have been leading auditors to say no to 
aggressive treatments chosen by their clients. But such nay saying has not been 
the practice. Application of principles in the manner contemplated requires 
exercises of judgment, exercises that captured auditors are disabled from 
'" D. Kennedy. 'Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication', 89 Han•. L. Rev. (1976) 
p. 1685, offers the classic description of standards in American jurisprudence. America's princi-
ples-based accounting advocates would be well advised to read it. 
•n SEC Report, op. cit. n. 13, s. III.I. 
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making. Principles-based accounting only works when the actor applying it 
takes responsibility for its judgments. 
The US accounting crisis stems less from the form of GAAP standards, 
whether rules- or principles-based, than from their application to fact and 
enforcement. The system's problems arise out of the professional relation 
between auditors and clients. It follows that SOA correctly prioritises profes-
sional regulation in the form of the new PCAOB. It is less clear that rules-based 
GAAP should be a present law reform target. Until the enforcement mechanism 
works more reliably- and the PCAOB is only beginning to task of correction-
a move to principles-based accounting could aggravate the crisis of confidence. 
